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INTRODUCTION
This consolidated appeal challenges the validity of the plea of guilty in the underlying
criminal case proceedings and the District’s Court’s summary dismissal of Appellant’s postconviction claims. The validity of the plea is challenged here from the perspective of the direct
appeal record alone and then, again, from the perspective of the more expansive post-conviction
record. The post-conviction claims encompass both the District Court’s role and trial counsel’s
role in the plea process. All of Appellant’s claims were dismissed, summarily, without an
evidentiary hearing.
Appellant will endeavor to reply to the Respondent’s arguments and will cite to the
APPELLANT’S BRIEF when appropriate and forego a repetition of arguments already made1.
On review of the District Court’s dismissal of post-conviction claims without an evidentiary
hearing, this Appellate Court must determine whether a relevant and genuine issue of fact exists,
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions, together with any affidavits on file, where
inferences are liberally construed in favor of the Appellant ( Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789,
792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004)). “Essentially, the task of this Court ‘is to determine whether
the appellant has alleged facts in his petition that, if true, would entitle him to relief.’”
Charboneau, Id. (quoting Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 932, 934, 801 P.2d 1283, 1285 (1990)).
Respondent’s principle argument on this appeal is the assertion that all of Appellant’s
claims are disproven by the record on direct appeal (Hallquist v. State, Ct. of Appeals No. 44678
(October 18, 2017)). That direct appeal record consists of (1) the acknowledgments on the
Advisory Form (PCR, pp. 25-32) and (2) Appellant’s colloquy with the District Court at the time
1

Citations to the record/transcript in this Reply will conform to the citations in the Appellant’s Amended Brief. The
direct appeal record will be referenced as “DAR, p. ___” and the post-conviction record will be referenced as “PCR,
___”. Transcripts of the pertinent court hearings from the direct appeal will be designated as “DATr, p.___” and
transcripts from the post-conviction appeal will be designated as “PCTr, p.___”1. The entire Pre-Sentence
Investigation has been made part of the record on direct appeal and is cited herein as “PSI, p.__”.
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the plea was entered (DATr, pp. 5-20). Appellant submits that he has shown that he is entitled to
relief on this record. This record goes far beyond mere self-serving contradictory statements but
establishes that both the District Court and trial counsel failed to ensure that Appellant received
the process and assistance required by law.

THE FACTUAL CONTEXT
Respondent asserts the proposition that the “state’s overwhelming evidence showed that
Hollingsworth committed an aggravated assault…” (RESPONDENT’S BRIEF, p. 37). The
District Court may have succumbed to this superficial assessment as well because trial counsel
failed to develop any defense in response to the State’s theory of the case. Appellate concedes
that appellate courts do consider the relative strength of the State’s proof when analyzing claims
such as these (see People v. Phipps, 2016 COA 190, 411 P.3d 1157 (2016)). However, in this
case, even the State’s proof was far from overwhelming, and in fact, supported Appellant’s
potential self-defense in many ways.
The nature of the crime bears repeating here:
The officer’s reports of the crime that were incorporated into the PSI
reflect the State’s perspective of the crime.
There were no independent witnesses, video or audio evidence as to what
happened during the confrontation between Appellant and Smith on February 3,
2016, at Darner’s residence – a townhome two doors down from Appellant’s.
Darner and Smith claimed Appellant attacked Smith when the door to the garage
was opened by Darner (PSI, pp. 73, 651, 652). Appellant allegedly told Officer
Pietrazk at the hospital, shortly after the confrontation, that “he did not remember
what happened” and that he went to Darner’s home that night to visit with her
dog, Duke, and that “he was jealous of her [Darner] dating” (PSI, pp. 651, 652).
From the officer’s perspective, Appellant was a jealous stalker bent on harm.
However, as stated above, the principal wounds suffered by Smith were
the nine stab wounds to his back (PSI, pp. 174, 678)2, arguably supportive of a
theory that Appellant was acting in self-defense. Also, of significance, were the
2

This citation to the record is erroneous; Smith’s medical records reflecting his injuries are contained in the PSI
discovery materials, p. 120 indicating “BACK: Showed 9 separate wounds”.
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events of January 21, 2016. Smith was Darner’s new boyfriend and spent the
night with her on January 21st (PSI, p. 651). Appellant had a lengthy prior
relationship - friendship, as well as romantic - with Darner who had expressed to
Appellant on January 21st, via email, that they needed “to move on” but remain
neighbors and friends (PSI, p. 901). Unknown to the investigating officers was
the fact that Appellant had earlier expressed his agreement with Darner that she
should “find somebody else” (PCR, p. 79, #1779). Thus, evidence was available
to trial counsel that tended to show that Appellant was comfortable with the
breakup with Darner prior to the confrontation and was not a jealous stalker.
(APPELLANT’S BRIEF, p. 35)
Moreover, Appellant established, through his post-conviction declarations, that victim
Darner harbored a motive to set Appellant up for the confrontation as well as many other factors
supporting self-defense.
Darner wanted to “set me up” because I was aware that Darner was in possession
of a stolen stove and repeatedly pressured her to return it, and I also was aware
that she was in violation of her probation. The day before the confrontation on
February 3, 2016, I told Darner that if her probation officers asked me about her
drinking, I would be truthful and inform them that she was in violation of
probation; Darner responded by saying that “they wouldn’t believe you if I get a
‘no contact’ order on you”. ”. Contrary to what Darner told the police
investigator, I was welcome to enter Darner’s garage to care for her dog and did
so on a daily basis; I stored frozen fish in her freezer in the garage and would
come over to take some using her knife to do so – the same knife I had during the
confrontation on February 3, 2016. Therefore, Darner knew I was in the garage
just prior to the confrontation on February 3, 2016. Darner lied to the police when
she claimed that I was jealous of her relationship with Smith; I had never met him
nor knew of their relationship prior to the confrontation. Darner lied to the police
when she claimed I entered the garage through the dog door – the garage door
was either unlocked or not fully closed; I had been in the garage with my fouryear old granddaughter the morning of February 3, 2016.
(DECLARATION OF BRET D. HOLLINGSWORTH,
PCR, p. 19)
Also, there is evidence in this record that victim Darner had been “badmouthing”
Appellant to victim Smith (PCR, p. 276). This police report details what Smith had told his
daughter, Alesha, about the incidents occurring on January 21st as told to him by Darner. In the
morning, Darner claimed that she was startled out of bed by Appellant, and in the evening,
-3-

Appellant allegedly had forced his way in and proceeded to call Darner and her mother
derogatory names.

The evening incident, if true, would likely convince Smith that

Hollingsworth was not welcome on her property and was jealous of Smith. Neither incident was
true and is highly disputed (THIRD DECLARATION OF BRET D. HOLLINGSWORTH, PCR,
p. 372, para 7).
Moreover, the significance of Detective Pietrazk’s interview of Appellant, referenced
above, cannot be overstated. The transcribed interview can be found at PCR, pp. 138-160 and its
value showing Appellant’s state of mind and his claim of self-defense was outlined in
APPELLANT’S BRIEF, pp. 31, 32. Suffice it to say that the interview, which occurred shortly
after Appellant was taken to the hospital after the confrontation in issue, reflects Appellant at a
very vulnerable time and in obvious pain. Pietrazk tries hard for an hour to obtain the confession
he wants, but Appellant, although having difficulty remembering, consistently denies any
criminal intent and, in fact, was not a jealous stalker, but was in Darner’s garage for an innocent
reason. This interview could have been used as the key piece of evidence for Appellant at trial
and upon which he could prove self-defense. This recording was not reviewed by trial counsel
who relied solely on Pietrazk’s report where the Detective claimed Appellant admitted to
jealousy (PCR, p. 275); trial counsel considered this characterization of the interview as the
“smoking gun” in the case (PCR, p. 34 (top)). The failure of trial counsel to review the Pietrazk
interview is a major aspect of trial counsel’s failure to prepare a defense.
Finally, it is exceedingly significant that the post-conviction record reflects that Appellant
repeatedly told his trial counsel these same factual matters consistent with what he told Pietrazk
with even more detail (APPELLANT’S BRIEF, pp. 44-48) because his memory had improved.
Appellant, in so many words, expressed the same consistent belief that he was taken by surprise
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and intended no harm to victim Smith to the District Court on three occasions: (1) at the plea
hearing, (2) in the PSI and (3) at the sentencing hearing. The Appellant asks this Appellate
Court to consider how rare it is that a defendant consistently professes innocence throughout the
entire process: interrogation, conferences with counsel and statements to the court. It is upon this
consistency that Appellant bases his claim that summary dismissal of claims here was error – the
District Court cannot be affirmed on the idea that the State’s case was overwhelming.

THE GUILTY PLEA
Appellant challenges the validity of the guilty plea on two levels: (1) the bare direct
appeal record and (2) the more expansive post-conviction record. Appellant submits that it was
an abuse of discretion for the District Court to accept Appellant’s plea on the bare record alone
as set forth in detail in APPELLANT’S BRIEF pp. 12-19.

The transcript of the plea hearing

speaks for itself. Because of its significance, Appellant will summarize the critical colloquy at
the plea hearing on August 10, 2016, again, here:
The District Court advised Appellant that it must satisfy itself that there is
a factual basis to accept a plea of guilty (DATr, p. 9). Appellant obediently
answered the District Court’s litany of questions regarding the knowing and
voluntary nature of the plea (Id, pp. 9–16). Then the District Court asked
Appellant what happened in order to establish a factual basis. The Appellant
informed the District Court that he was in the garage at the residence in issue for
innocent purposes, did not know that the alleged victim Smith was present, was
taken by surprise and did not intend to harm anyone (Id, pp. 16–17.) Appellant
did not specifically recall stabbing anyone because he was suffering from head
trauma (Id, 17). The District Court then gleaned that Appellant was suggesting
that he acted in self-defense, but did not advise Appellant of the elements of selfdefense (Id, p. 17). Appellant indicated that he still wanted to plead guilty
because “I believe I stabbed Mr. Smith, Your Honor, and it was an unlawful act”
(Id, p. 18). The prosecutor proceeded to relate to the District Court what the
alleged victims told the investigating officers (Id, pp. 18, 19). The District Court
then accepted the Appellant’s plea, without asking him if he disputed what the
prosecutor had just represented - Appellant responded by stating that he believed
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he was guilty. Again, there was no preliminary hearing to support a factual basis
for acceptance of the plea.
(APPELLANT’S BRIEF, pp. 6, 7)3
Clearly, the District Court faced an anomaly at the plea hearing – the Court was
expecting Appellant to provide a factual basis for the plea, but he clearly did not. Before
addressing what the District Court should have done at this juncture, it is important to note that a
defendant goes before the District Court in a very subordinate position. Courtroom proceedings
are very formal and intimidating and a defendant has, likely, already decided to plead guilty; this
step of the process is not an “arm’s length” interview where one can truly raise questions to the
court for fear of upsetting the process4. Moreover, Appellant did not come into court refreshed
and “off the street” so to speak – he could not post bail and spent months in jail with serious
medical conditions (PCR, p. 20, para 4(d)).
Idaho Appellate Courts have repeatedly described the District Court’s role at a plea
hearing as follows:
What is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment demands the
utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the
accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of
its consequence. When the judge discharges that function, he leaves a record
adequate for any review that may be later sought, and forestalls the spin-off of
collateral proceedings that seek to probe murky memories." 395 U.S. 238, at 24344, 89 S.Ct. 1709, at 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) (citations and footnotes
omitted).
(State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 34,
557 P.2d 626, 628 (1976)) (emphasis added)

3. Appellant consistently voiced these facts to the pre-sentence investigator and again at the sentencing hearing (PSI,
pp. 6, 7; DATr, pp. 44-54).
4. Appellant had numerous questions at this juncture as reflected in his contemporaneous notes (PCR, pp. 33, 34)
addressed in more detail later in this Reply Brief.
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Solicitude means care or concern. In the court setting discussed here, utmost solicitude
means a meaningful effort to ensure that a defendant truly understands the nature of the charge.
Clearly, Appellant did not – he was under the mistaken belief that self-defense applied only in
his own home (PCR, p. 73, para 3). Rule 11(c) requires a court to consider reasonable inferences
from the record of the proceedings – the reasonable inference here, from what Appellant was
proclaiming, is that he did not understand the nature of the crime and “believed” what he did was
unlawful because he did stab victim Smith. There was no real solicitude provided to Appellant;
the District Court never explained the elements of self-defense nor did the District Court ask
Appellant if he agreed with the State’s offer of proof as to the factual basis for the plea.
Respondent argues that the District Court is not required to recite potential defenses
(RESPONDENT’S BRIEF, p. 18). It is true that courts are not necessarily required to discuss
potential defenses with a defendant; however, is not a further discussion merited when a court is
faced with the anomaly presented here? The District Court could have explained the elements of
self-defense and then asked Appellant why he wanted to plead guilty which likely would have
lead into a discussion of what constitutes self-defense, that is, reasonable fear of bodily harm,
etc. At a minimum, the District Court could have stated that it was not comfortable accepting the
plea and continued the matter so Appellant could further discuss the situation with counsel (see
State v. Coffin, 104 Idaho 543, 661 P.2d 328 (1983)). Further questioning or a postponement
would have satisfied the “utmost solicitude” requirement; this is why the process requires a judge
rather than just a clerk. Also, given Appellant’s frustration with his counsel’s assistance,
discussed below, he would have had time to hire a new attorney.
The dialogue between the District Court and Appellant was in, no way, thorough and
detailed as contemplated by Schmidt v. State, 103 Idaho 340, 647 P.2d 796 (Ct. App. 1982) or
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Sparrow v. State, 102 Idaho 60, 625 P.2d 414 (1981). Respondent suggests the District Court
fulfilled its duties under Schmidt because Appellant did not object to the State’s offer of a factual
basis and did not disagree with the language of the charging document (RESPONDENT’S
BRIEF, p. 21) resorting to sarcasm as argument (“nitpick”, “quibbles” “musing”, Id, pp. 19, 21).
The more significant event is that Appellant’s counsel did not object.
The core dilemma for the Appellate Court is to decide whether Appellant’s intent at the
time of the alleged offense matters in this case despite the general intent nature of the crime in
issue.

As stated above, it is undisputed that Appellant consistently maintained to the District

Court that he had no intent to harm anyone, was taken by surprise, did not know victim Smith
was present at Darner’s home and was invited to the home to visit Darner’s dog which he did
every day. In liberally construing the facts in this record in favor of Appellant, it appears to
show, at a minimum, a genuine issue of fact as to whether Appellant understood the nature of the
charge he faced. Consequently, this Court should reverse the District Court and grant relief to
Appellant, on the direct record alone. The District Court’s failure to engage Appellant at a
critical time, with the required “utmost solicitude”, and the acceptance of the plea of guilty
constitutes an abuse of discretion.
The plea process was further flawed when analyzed from the perspective of the more
expansive post-conviction record. As a preliminary matter, the State below and Respondent here
rely upon North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed. 2d 162(1970);
Appellant concedes that Idaho courts have accepted its holding with respect to the acceptance of
a guilty plea in circumstances such as those presented here (see Schmidt, infra).

Specifically,

Alford stands for the proposition that if a defendant expresses a desire to enter a guilty plea,
even though asserting innocence, the trial court may accept the plea anyway, unless the court
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receives information before sentencing that raises a doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.
Appellant has already established, above, that reasonable inferences from the direct record
(Appellant’s statements at the plea hearing, in the PSI and at sentencing) show doubt as to
Appellant’s intent and guilt. Alford further implies that such pleas (“Alford pleas”) must be
premised on competent counsel as insurance that a defendant truly elects to plead guilty
despite asserting innocence.
Appellant was not represented by competent counsel. Appellant’s post-conviction
claims incorporate specific assertions of ineffective assistance at the plea process which, to
some extent, explain the anomaly the District Court faced – Appellant indicated his desire to
plead guilty even though he misunderstood the nature of the crime.
A very significant aspect of Appellant’s proof supporting the claim of ineffective
assistance at the plea hearing itself is his contemporaneous notes (PCR, pp. 33, 34). These
notes written to his trial counsel are powerful, admissible evidence (see I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B))
of Appellant’s state of mind the day before the entry of plea. At the top of page 33,
Appellant writes: “rushed into a corner, no options”, “so many things I don’t understand”,
“what do or does my charges say?, Elements?”, “Just out of time”, “Where have you been”,
“You make me seem I was guilty of entering darla’s house and stabbing smith”. At the
bottom of page 33, Appellant further writes: “How am I supposed to discuss these question
[Advisory Form] with you when you get offended, can’t I talk to the judge – 4,3 – 53, Q’s”,
“we haven’t discussed anything, and out of time, you told me can’t get discovery, there is
none, BPD won’t give it to us, tapes . . .” The second page of these notes (PCR, p. 34)
further corroborates Appellant’s claims that he “continually asked for Medical Care…mental
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health professional…interpretation of statutes” and sums up his frustration by stating: “I
don’t feel my attorney has my best interest”.
Clearly this evidence raises genuine issues of fact as to trial counsel’s effectiveness
and Appellant’s understanding of the charge and process. This is the type of proof that
defeats the general rule that contradictory post-plea statements by a defendant can be
disproven and dismissed by the record. It is astonishing that the District Court did not even
address these notes in its First DECISION granting summary judgment to the State regarding
the validity of plea (PCR, pp. 110-122). Respondent does address these notes and concedes
they reflect some confusion (RESPONDENT’S BRIEF, p. 29); however, Respondent then
discounts the import of these notes;
No doubt Hollingsworth had questions for his attorney before he pleaded, as
his notes appear to show. (see PCR, pp. 33, 34.) But this is precisely why
trial counsel spent additional time with him the following morning “going
through the questions that he needed some clarification on.” (8/10/16 Tr., p. 7,
Ls 20-23.) And it is clear that this additional time was sufficient to clear up
Hollingsworth’s questions, because he then swore, under oath, that he “had
enough time to talk” to his attorney and she answered all his questions
(8/10/16 Tr., p. 10, Ls 11 - 18.)
(Id, p. 30)
Respondent is asking the Appellate Court to conclude that trial counsel’s statements at
the plea hearing prove that all Appellant’s questions were answered and his concerns allayed.
However, trial counsel’s representations to the District Court are directly challenged by
Appellant (see PCR, pp. 21, 22, para g).

Equally important is the reasonable conclusion that

Appellant’s questions and concerns could not be effectively addressed in a short conference just
before the critical hearing. These questions and concerns are not just technical matters, but go
directly to the effectiveness of counsel generally. Appellant is raising concerns about trial
counsel’s preparedness and their “Relationship” – “how am I supposed to discuss these questions
- 10 -

with you when you get offended . . .” (PCR, p. 33). No rote “yes” or “no” questioning by the
court would cure this problem. Furthermore, in the post-conviction proceedings, Appellant was
not able to question trial counsel about her discussions with Appellant regarding the Advisory
Form because the District Court at first denied Appellant’s discovery request altogether and
subsequently granted it after the District Court’s Second DECISION (PCR, pp. 174–179,
7/11/18) in limited fashion; discovery was allowed up to the waiver of the preliminary hearing
only – five months before the plea hearing (see PCR, pp. 84, 85; PCR pp. 6, 7, CASE
SUMMARY).
Aside from the notes addressed above, Appellant has asserted numerous other grounds
with evidence, based upon the expansive post-conviction record, supporting his contention that it
was error for the District Court to grant summary judgment (First DECISION, 6/7/2018) with
respect to the validity of plea. These assertions and the supporting evidence are set forth in
APPELLANT’S BRIEF, pp. 25–35) and include trial counsel’s fear of the process and
intimidation, Appellant’s competency, advice regarding elements of the crime and self-defense,
investigation, review of discovery materials and potential pretrial motions5. Appellant will not
restate the argument here as Respondent did not address these issues except for trial counsel’s
fear and intimidation (RESPONDENT’S BRIEF, p. 31). The prejudice to Appellant resulting
from the cumulative effect of these deficiencies was simply that he felt he had no choice but to
plead guilty:
As I stated in my prior DECLARATION, I was so “beaten down” by my
counsel’s failure to defend me, coupled with my impaired physical and mental
state, that I found myself in a hopeless situation with no choice but to plead
guilty; I therefore checked all the appropriate boxes in the Advisory Form and
answered the Court’s questions at the plea hearing to simply get the matter over
with, simply and quickly, despite my lack of understanding of the process, as I
have set out in detail in my initial DECLARATION.
5

The alleged deficiency regarding the waiver of the preliminary hearing will be addressed later in this Reply Brief.
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(PCR, p. 73)
Consequently, this Appellate Court must determine whether genuine issues of fact exists
from Appellant’s evidence that, if resolved in favor of Appellant, would entitle him to relief.
The District Court’s grant of summary judgment (First DECISION) was error6. The disputed
issues of fact go directly to trial counsel’s effectiveness and should have been addressed by the
District Court.
DIRECT APPEAL RULE 33 and 35 MOTIONS
The District Court re-entered a JUDGMENT & COMMITMENT in the criminal case on
June 7, 2018 (DAR, p. 144-147) as a result of the post-conviction proceedings and the District
Court’s finding that trial counsel failed to file a notice of appeal.

Prior to direct appeal,

Appellant, on June 27, 2018, filed a MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA AND
RECONSIDERATION OF SENTENCE (DAR, pp. 137–139). The basis for these MOTIONS
was the post-conviction proceedings then pending. Also, on June 19, 2018, Appellant had filed
an extensive MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
(PCR, pp. 161- 168) with Appellant’s supporting declarations PCR, pp. 169 – 173). Moreover,
the issue of trial counsel’s waiver of the preliminary hearing was still pending. Appellant
requested that the District Court take judicial notice of the entire post-conviction file, specifically
the eight items outlined in the MOTION (Id, p. 137).
On August 21, 2018, the District Court declined to take judicial notice because
“Defendant’s filings in CV01-17-19830 do not present any argument, authority, or analysis of
‘manifest injustice’, as required by the Court to find pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c)”

6

The District Court does not even address Appellant’s claim that he was not advised as to the restitution consequent
of his plea (PCR, p. 73, para 4). Appellant raised this issue in his RESPONSE TO STATE’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION (PCR, p. 106); the District acknowledged the claim (PCR, p. 121) without discussion.
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(DAR, p. 148). However, had the District Court subsequently found a basis to grant relief
(denial of due process or denial of Sixth Amendment right to counsel), in the post-conviction
proceedings, the “manifest injustice” required for a Rule 33 Motion would have been found (see
State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 98, 156 P.3d 1193, 1196 (2017)).
With respect to judicial notice, I.R.E. 201(b) provides that a court may take judicial
notice of a fact when the fact is capable of accurate determination by resorting to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Under I.R.E. 201(d), a court must take judicial notice
of records, exhibits, or transcripts from the court file in the same or a separate case if requested
by a party and supplied with the necessary information. To provide the necessary information,
"the party shall identify the specific documents or items for which the judicial notice is requested
or shall proffer to the court and serve on all parties copies of such documents or items".
Appellant complied with the Rule. It was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to deny
the request for judicial review.
Also, Respondent submits a curious argument that the District Court had no jurisdiction
over the Rule 33 and 35 Motions based on untimeliness. Citing to State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho
352, 79 P.3d 711 (2003), Respondent suggests that “the District Court no longer had jurisdiction
to hear Hollingsworth’s motion to withdraw his plea, which was filed well after the expiration of
the time to appeal” (RESPONDENT’S BRIEF p. 23). Actually, these motions were filed on
June 27, 2018, before the appeal was filed on July 16, 2018 (DAR p. 140).
Obviously, the District Court never reached the merits of these Motions which were yet
to be “fleshed out” in the post-conviction proceedings. Appellant suggests that, for some reason,
the District Court was never really interested in the merits, perhaps because of its own role in
what was claimed as a defective process. The District Court’s resolution of these Motions
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without addressing the merits reflects an attitude of unconcern for any meaningful analysis of
Appellant’s claims as witnessed by the failure to address Appellant’s contemporaneous notes
mentioned above.

This is a recurring theme throughout the post-conviction proceedings and

resurfaced at the next step – APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Appellant’s MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, filed June 19, 2018 (PCR. pp. 161–
168) was an attempt to show the District Court that the alleged failings of trial counsel should
not have been viewed separately or piece-meal, but as a whole, invoking the “cumulative error”
doctrine. If the District Court’s analysis had viewed the ineffective assistance claims as related,
it may have found that “an accumulation of irregularities, each of which might be harmless in
itself, may in the aggregate reveal the absence of a fair trial in contravention of the defendant’s
right to due process” (see Adamcik v. State, 163 Idaho 114, 408 P. 3d 474, 487 (2017)).
Appellant submitted significant new material for the District Court’s consideration
despite no authorization for discovery at this point in time7. This new material consisted of trial
counsel’s notes (PCR, pp. 126–135), a Certificate of Authenticity regarding documents received
from trial counsel’s office (PCR, pp. 136–137) and a transcription of the Pietrazk interview
reviewed

above

(PCR,

pp.

138–160).

Also,

Appellant

submitted

his

SECOND

SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION BRET D. HOLLINGSWORTH (PCR, pp. 169–173).
The significance of these new materials has already been set out in APPELLANT’S
BRIEF, pp. 30–35. Again, the significance of the Pietrazk interview cannot be overstated – it
would have been the centerpiece of self-defense. The Pietrzak recording was also particularly

7

Appellant’s post-conviction claims encompassed the entire process through sentencing, yet the District Court
ultimately authorized discovery only up to the waiver of the preliminary hearing at an early stage of the process.
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significant with respect to the claim that trial counsel had failed to investigate and review
discovery materials in the case. This failing caused very significant prejudice to Appellant
because the recording was, in trial counsel’s advice to Appellant, the “smoking gun” in the case
(PCR, p. 34 (top)). The “smoking gun” was the alleged admission in Pietrazk’s report that
Appellant was jealous of victim Smith; an admission taken completely out of context and
untrue. Trial counsel never questioned this alleged, critical admission because she did not
review the tape-recorded interrogation.
Equally important were trial counsel’s notes. As detailed in the APPELLANT’S BRIEF,
these notes reveal that Appellant told trial counsel that he never meant harm to victim Smith and
did not know he was present at Darner’s home on the night of the confrontation (PCR, p. 130,
134), nor did he cause damage to Smith’s vehicle (Id), as insinuated by Darner and Smith. Also,
Appellant raised several issues relating to victim credibility that went uninvestigated by trial
counsel but were relevant to the victims’ motives, their credibility and their misrepresentations to
the investigating officers. For example, the notes reflect that Appellant was welcome in Darner’s
home to visit her dog, that he never knew or met victim Smith and had encouraged Darner to
“find somebody else”. In summary, these notes were completely consistent with what Appellant
had told Pietrazk and the District Court concerning his knowledge of the alleged crime,
particularly his intent.
The District Court’s failed to address any of this new material. The District Court relied
solely on the “cumulative error doctrine” which requires a finding of more than one error; the
District Court concluded that “the Court has not found any errors in this case” (PCR, p. 176).
Apparently, the District Court had forgotten the error already found – the failure of trial counsel
to file an appeal. In summary, the District Court missed the point of the MOTION FOR
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RECONSIDERATION – Appellant was requesting the District Court to reconsider the claims
dismissed, in light of the evidence (Appellant’s notes counsel’s notes, Pietrazk interview, etc.)
for the interrelated or cumulative effect of irregularities that “in the aggregate show the absence
of a fair trial [process]”. The denial of the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (Second
DECISION) was error. Nevertheless, the District Court had a third opportunity to seriously
address Appellant’s evidence and proof.

WAIVER OF THE PRELIMINARY HEARING
The third opportunity given for the District Court to seriously consider Appellant’s proof
occurred when both parties filed respective motions for summary judgment with respect to the
waiver of the preliminary hearing.

This issue encapsulated all of Appellant’s claims of

ineffective counsel, that is, the failure to advise, investigate and prepare a defense, in accord with
her client’s direction; these failings lead to the waiver which, in turn, contaminated the entire
defense and left Appellant “in a hopeless situation with no choice but to plead guilty” (PCR, p.
74, para 5).
The District Court initially recognized the significance of the waiver.

In its First

DECISION:

In this case, given that the State submitted an Amended Complaint during the
preliminary hearing adding an enhancement to the charged crimes and it does not
appear that any plea deal had been discussed or agreed upon, under an objective
review of the record and the uncontroverted evidence, there does not appear to be
any strategic or tactical reason for waiving the preliminary hearing.
(PCR, p. 120)

- 16 -

However, in the District Court’s short explanation for ultimately dismissing this claim8,
there is no mention of the significance of the preliminary hearing. The significance is set forth
in the DECLARATION OF GEORGE C. PATTERSON, Esq. (PCR, pp. 41-43).

These

declarations by Patterson describing the importance of the preliminary hearing (Id, paras 7–10)
The District Court did not address the Patterson concerns. Appellant is, hopefully, speaking to
Appellate Judges who have actually represented a client facing a serious criminal prosecution for
Patterson outlines why a waiver of the preliminary hearing should never be taken lightly as was
the case with Appellant’s trial counsel. The right to a preliminary hearing is not just to test
probable cause, but is the equivalent of a limited deposition in a civil proceeding – it is the only
opportunity to place adverse witnesses under oath and should never be relinquished without
consideration (plea bargain, etc.). But this is precisely what Appellant’s counsel did.
As was the case with respect to the first two DECISIONS, the District Court never
addressed the proof and argument offered by Appellant at this last step in the post-conviction
proceedings. Instead, in this Third DECISION, the District Court held that trial counsel had two
strategic reasons for waiving the preliminary hearing: (1) avoid further antagonizing the victims
and (2) avoid telegraphing questions to these witnesses (PCTr, pp. 10-11). More specifically, the
District Court reasoned: “And it is a reasonable explanation in my view that she would counsel a
client not to further antagonize the State, which had an offer on the table at the time the
preliminary hearing was waived, in order to maintain that” (Id, p. 10, L’s 9-18). “And also,
frankly, I think I can infer from her comments that there might have been another strategic

8

The District Court was most concerned about the foundation for the admission of Officers Rock and Iversons’
transcribed interviews of Darner and Smith (PCTr, pp. 5-10) and Appellant’s request for further discovery (original
tape-recordings (PCR, p. 448)). These transcriptions were submitted as attachments B(1) & B(2) to the THIRD
SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF JOHN C. LYNN (PCR, pp. 372-397). The State initially objected to these
transcriptions (PCR, p. 445), but at the February 19, 2019 hearing, conceded that the foundation objection had been
satisfied (PCRTr, p. 5, L 25).
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reason not to put Ms. Darner on the stand even if she intended to attack her credibility later,
which she could have at the trial if she had gone to trial. And one of those reasons would not to
telegraph to that witness . . . “(Id, pp. 10, 11; L’s 19–3; emphasis added).
There are numerous flaws in the District Court analysis. First, as far as the “offer on the
table”, trial counsel knew that Appellant was not pleading guilty, wanted the case investigated
and a defense prepared. Thus, trial counsel knew that the plea bargain “offer on the table” would
expire. Second, the District Court is inferring a rationale. Third, and most important, it is
disputed that these rationales were ever communicated to the client; the only advice provided by
trial counsel in regard to the waiver was that the State had enough evidence to bind him over
(PCR, p. 373, 374, para 9); Appellant was not even aware that the plea bargain offer would
expire (Id, para 8). Moreover, there was no written communication to Appellant explaining
these rationalizations which one would assume would have been forthcoming from a competent
counsel.

Likewise, there is nothing in trial counsel’s notes reflecting any such advice to

Appellant (PCR, pp. 291 -302).
Ultimately, the Appellate Court must decide if the reasonable inferences from the totality
of the record supports the District Court’s analysis or supports the idea that trial counsel’s
articulated strategy at her deposition was a “post hoc rationalization” (see Wiggins v. Smith, 539
U.S. 526-26, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 156 L. Ed. 471 (2003)).
Contrary to the District Court’s analysis, Appellant’s MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT was based on undisputed facts, mostly from trial counsel’s deposition
(APPELLANT’S BRIEF, pp. 33–58). A summary of these undisputed facts is as follows:
1. Trial counsel had minimal felony criminal defense experience (Id, p. 41).
2. Trial counsel allowed the initial plea bargain offer to expire for no consideration from
the State (Id, pp. 41- 44) – the expiration came as surprise to her.
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3. Appellant told trial counsel that he intended no harm to Smith and did not know he
was in Darner’s house (Id, p. 44).
4. Appellant told trial counsel that Darner harbored a motive to set him up because he
warned her that he would tell her probation officer that she was drinking and was in
possession of stolen property, giving trial counsel the name and number of the person
who could verify the stolen property (Id, pp. 44 – 45).
5. Trial counsel did not see anything that Appellant told her as supporting self-defense
because her client had “no memory of the incident” (Id, p. 45).
6. Trial counsel was not aware of the police report which showed that Darner had been
“badmouthing” Appellant to Smith (Id, pp. 46 - 47).
7. Appellant told trial counsel that he knew nothing about a sword that Darner had
insinuated to the police officers belonged to Appellant (Id, p. 47).
8. Trial counsel undertook no independent investigation of the case despite her client’s
numerous requests ( Id, p. 48).
9. Trial counsel reviewed only 84 of 830 pages of discovery and her billing records
show no review of the police recordings, including the very significant Pietrazk
interview, as well as the Rock and Iverson tapes which reflect inconsistent
statements from Darner and Smith (Id, pp. 48 – 50).
10. Trail counsel’s strategy in the case was to minimize incarceration by waiving the
preliminary hearing to lessen victim hostility (Id, pp. 50 - 52).
11. Trial counsel saw no credibility issues of significance because “it was pretty clear
what happened” (Id, pp. 52, 53).
12. Trial counsel saw no value in seeking a continuance to complete a discovery
review, investigate the case or negotiate for a more favorable plea agreement (Id, p.
54).
Also, of significance is the previous finding by the District Court that trial counsel had
failed to file a notice of appeal. Finally, a review of trial counsel’s billing records (PCR pp. 253,
254, TH) for her time billed prior to the waiver reflects virtually no time expended for
preparation or investigation – the great bulk of time billed was for the two meetings with
Appellant (2/26/16 and 3/2/16), her travel time and the court appearances.
The most significant failing of trial counsel was summed up in APPELLANT’S
AMENDED BRIEF as follows:
Regardless of what the officers reported, the most important basis from which an
objective strategy can be developed is from the client. It is objectively
unreasonable for an attorney to fashion a strategy contrary to the client’s
expressed desire. In this case, there is no dispute that the client, Appellant, told
Hales that he intended no harm and that his goal was to develop this defense with
a strategy of investigating critical aspects of the case, including credibility issues.
- 19 -

As a consequence, Hales’ tactical decision to waive the hearing was in direct
contrast to what Appellant wanted to do – he wanted Hales to investigate these
issues and then decide whether to pursue and develop them at a preliminary
hearing. Hales’ failure to investigate and her recommendation to waive the
preliminary hearing diverged from what Appellant wanted her to do. It is this
failure to represent the client that is at the center of this case. Hales ignored the
directives from her client because she was only interested in waiving the
preliminary hearing and pleading him guilty. This approach is directly
contrary to counsel’s duty to investigate.
(Id, pp. 5, 56) (emphasis added)
Respondent’s arguments that trial counsel’s waiver of the preliminary hearing was part of
a legitimate strategy is based on the assumption that trial counsel actually undertook an
investigation of the case. Respondent correctly cites to Strickland’s standards regarding the duty
to investigate (Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)), and the corollary proposition that
“when counsel focuses on some issues to the exclusion of others, there is a strong presumption
that he or she did so for tactical reasons rather than through sheer neglect” (RESPONDENT’S
BRIEF, p. 35). The problem here is that trial counsel undertook no investigation; there was no
“focus on some issues”. The most reasonable inference form the undisputed facts here is that trial
counsel had no interest in preparing a defense.
Respondent also asserts the idea that the preliminary hearing would have had little value
to the defense because of the State’s “overwhelming evidence” (Id, 37). The overwhelming
evidence of the State’s case was addressed above – suffice it to say that Appellant consistently
told Pietrazk (at the hospital, his trial counsel), the District Court and the PSI investigator that he
intended no harm, did not know of Smith’s presence and was taken by surprise.
Finally, Respondent asserts that the preliminary hearing would have been of little value
because “Hollingsworth never identified any credibility issues between Smith and Darner
regarding the stabbing itself (RESPONDENT’S BRIEF, p. 37). But there were such issues;

- 20 -

examples of such are set out in APPELLANT’S BRIEF, p. 49, and are based on the taperecorded interviews and police reports which trial counsel did not have at the time of the waiver.
Again, Appellant consistently maintained throughout the process that he was taken by surprise
when the door was opened at the critical time.

Coupling this event with (1) Appellant’s

consistent representations that he intended no harm constitutes self-defense, (2) Darner’s motive
to set Appellant up and (3) Darner’s priming, or “badmouthing”, of Appellant, forms the basis of
self-defense.
The suggestion by the Respondent and the District Court that any impeachment could
have been done just as effectively at trial as at the preliminary hearing merits close inspection.
First, such a proposition is highly speculative. Second, the preliminary hearing offers a limited
opportunity to uncover more detailed facts, pin-down and clarify witness testimony and lay the
groundwork for later impeachment at trial. Third, this all would have been done under oath,
which is important - as any trial attorney knows impeaching a witness who has testified falsely
under oath is far more effective than impeaching with just the prior inconsistent statement. This
is why trial attorneys always take extensive depositions in civil cases. All of this groundwork
could have been accomplished without engendering victim hostility; open-ended, non-aggressive
questioning would have achieved the goals set out above.
Respondent further suggests that it would be foolish to use the preliminary hearing to
educate the prosecutor on the weaknesses of the State’s case (RESPONDENT’S Brief, p. 40).
This argument reflects a lack of experience with the criminal process. It is always wise to
demonstrate to the prosecutor weaknesses in the State’s case in an effort to reach a plea
agreement, which occurs in most cases. The problem for prosecutors is that they have little time
to research the details of the case until, perhaps, the eve of trial when it is too late to negotiate a
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bargain. For example, the prosecutor here would likely rely on Pietrazk’s report and assume
Appellant admitted jealousy – the motive to attack Smith and the so-called “smoking gun”.
However, putting Pietrazk on the stand at the preliminary hearing would have revealed that the
actual tape-recorded interview supported a motion to suppress (because of Appellant’s physical
condition and his ability to waive his rights), but, in fact, was exculpatory.
There were many credibility issues that surfaced in this case as outlined above.
Appellant poses this question to this Appellate Court: if you were representing Appellant in this
case, would you forego an opportunity to question the State’s witnesses under oath solely to
avoid hostility and/or telegraph impeachment issues? These rationales could be asserted in any
case.

This strategy might be appropriate in some cases where the State’s proof is truly

overwhelming or the key witness is a child. But the point here is that such a strategy should be
well thought through, based on appropriate investigation and preparation and, most assuredly,
communicated to the client with considered deliberation. Trial counsel could have done so here,
but it would have required a continuance to obtain all the discovery materials.
The ultimate destination in this case is the question: does the totality of proof support
Respondent’s position that trial counsel engaged in a legitimate strategy, based on appropriate
consideration and preparation, or was it, more likely, an ad hoc rationalization? Since this case
comes forward from the grant of summary disposition, this Appellate Court must make its
decision based on undisputed facts. Appellant respectfully submits that those undisputed facts
show no real preparation by trial counsel preceding the waiver of a critical right and opportunity.
.

Respondent cites to three cases in support of its argument that Appellant suffered no

prejudice (RESPONDENT’S BRIEF, p. 41) – none are pertinent. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52
(1985), dealt with an alleged failure by counsel to properly advise of parole considerations and
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no prejudice was alleged. LeBarge v. State, 116 Idaho 782 P.2d 59 (Ct. App. 1989), involved a
post-conviction claim unsupported by any facts. State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 967 P.2d 702
(1998), involved a waiver of a preliminary hearing by the petitioner himself for specific reasons.
In contrast, as argued above, the waiver was the “lynchpin” to Appellant’s ultimate plea of guilty
– he lost faith in his counsel and had “no choice” but to plead guilty. Thus summary judgment
should have been granted to Appellant and the conviction vacated on the basis that trial counsel
was ineffective in waiving the preliminary hearing.

CONCLUSION
Surely the goal of finality in criminal proceedings is important and post-conviction
petitions always reflect discontent with the outcome of the process. However, the rare case does
surface where an appellate court must grapple with the idea that the process was not well-served.
This is such a case – Appellant fell “through the cracks” so to speak. The District Court was not
sufficiently attuned to what Appellant was trying to communicate and failed with respect to the
solicitude required whenever a guilty plea is tendered. In addition, unknown to the District
Court, was the pathetic defense put up for Appellant by trial counsel who failed, not only to
prepare and investigate, but follow the explicit directives of her client. It is no wonder Appellant
gave up on his counsel and attempted to explain his case to the District Court to no avail.
In analyzing the legal questions here, Appellant requests this Appellate Court to consider
how rare it is that a petitioner/defendant consistently maintains two aspects of self-defense - no
“intent to harm” and “taken by surprise” - to the investigating officers, his counsel and the
District Court. In this light, no objective review of this record could lead to the conclusion, with
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confidence, that the process was fair. The District Court should be reversed and summary
judgment should be entered for Appellant and the conviction is issue vacated.

Respectfully submitted this 15th day of October, 2019.

BY: /s/ John C. Lynn
JOHN C. LYNN
Attorney for the Appellant
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Electronic Filing to the following to:
Kale D. Gans
ecf@ag.idaho.gov

Dated this 15th day October, 2019.
/s/John C. Lynn
JOHN C. LYNN
Attorney for Appellant
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